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# PLATO PHAEDRUS



Translation with notes, glossary, appendices,  
Interpretative Essay and Introduction

Stephen Scully

# Plato's *Phaedrus*

A translation with notes, glossary, appendices,  
Interpretive Essay and Introduction

Stephen Scully

Albert Keith Whitaker

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## INTRODUCTION

The *Phaedrus* is Plato's least political dialogue. Its central themes—rhetoric, love, the soul—recur throughout Plato's writings, but philosophically, poetically, and topographically, the *Phaedrus* is a world apart. Socrates pays lip-service in this dialogue to the public role of rhetoric in the political assemblies and the law-courts, but he defines the art of rhetoric as “soul-leading” in one-on-one exchange, the only true occasion for philosophy. Phaedrus, the single other person in the dialogue, is bewildered when he first hears this definition. The conception of love is also completely stripped of any political relevance. This sets the *Phaedrus* far apart from both the *Symposium* and *Republic*, with which it otherwise has much in common. In the *Symposium*, the competing pulls between earthly and heavenly love, between rewards of the flesh and of the spirit, are dramatized in the figure of Alcibiades, at a cross-roads in his life between following a philosophical path or continuing in his promising political career. The storm clouds of the disastrous Sicilian expedition and of the condemnation of Alcibiades in the law courts which will break over Athens a few months after the fictional setting of the *Symposium* suggest how important Alcibiades' inner struggle will be for the welfare of the city. Questions about love no less permeate the *Republic's* search for an ideal political regime. Not so in the *Phaedrus*. Like the views of rhetoric, views of love in this dialogue are far removed from the political arena.

In other Platonic dialogues, moderation is a cardinal virtue, recognized for its key role in enabling a soul or a state to attain harmony within itself. In the *Phaedrus* as well, moderation is honored for its role in taming monstrous appetite and leading the soul towards a vision of heavenly Beauty, but in the climactic paragraph of his second speech Socrates chastises mortal moderation for its miserly, economizing, and slavish nature, saying that a soul led by (mortal) moderation alone and not driven wild

by love will be condemned to roam for 9,000 years in mindless fashion around the earth, and beneath it. A divine madness, infused with erotic passion, must seized the soul if it ever hopes to recall its former life in the heavens among the gods. This is an ecstatic vision, cut free in significant ways from Plato's normal political preoccupations.

The reason for this anomaly is not hard to find. Late in the morning on a blistering hot summer day, Socrates saw his younger friend, barefoot, headed toward the city gate. Asked where he is headed, Phaedrus says that he is going to the country to practice a brilliant speech which he heard Lysias deliver the day before. This is enough to seduce Socrates to go outside Athens in the hope that Phaedrus' speech-making will cure him of his passion for speeches. On the way out, Socrates sees something bulging under Phaedrus' cloak and surmises, correctly, that it must be the papyrus roll of Lysias' *written* text. Socrates now insists that Phaedrus find a suitable place to read this to him.

Phaedrus leads Socrates to a grove, shaded by a tall plane tree, on the far side of the river Ilissos. It turns out to be a fortuitous choice. A moderate breeze blows through the grove; in addition to the shade of the plane tree, there is a tall willow shrub in full bloom, diffusing throughout the grove a pleasant perfume. The men's feet are cooled by a spring below, and overhead a chorus of cicadas sing, causing the breeze to reverberate with their high-pitched song. Underfoot are soft grasses. It also happens that the grove is sacred, the haunt of nymphs and the river god Achelous, as the statues there testify, and, as we learn later, it is sacred to Pan ("All").<sup>1</sup>

This grove prefigures many important retreats in later ancient literature. Its features are replicated in pastoral poetry, for example in Theocritus' *Idylls* and in Vergil's *Eclogues*. Events in the *Phaedrus* also shape conventional pastoral themes: poets in the company of nymphs, the concern for art and song-making, talk of boy-love, contests between speakers, often with a judge mediating. Many features of the grove (without the statues of the gods) will also re-appear in the form of the Epicurean garden, the place of retreat and philosophical tranquility where true fellowship and discourse can occur away from the distractions of city-life (cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* II.29-33). With the re-introduction of the *Phaedrus* to the west in the 1480s, western literature will again be touched by the power of such a place to alter the imagination. To quote Theseus from *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (V.i): "The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,/ Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;/ And as imagination bodies forth/ The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen/ Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing/ A local habitation and a name."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Glossary under *Grove*.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix E.

The grove has no less an effect upon Socrates. When he has first arrived, Socrates says in a famous passage: "Country places and trees do not wish to teach me anything, but human beings in the city do." In thinking this, Socrates is following the maxim inscribed on Apollo's temple at Delphi, "know thyself," which the city philosopher interprets in the sense that human nature differs from nature's nature. But Socrates still has much to learn about the human. Later in the dialogue, he will compare himself to Odysseus passing by the Sirens unscathed; the journey he is about to go on is in many ways more far-flung than Odysseus' from Troy to Ithaca.

Although Phaedrus is in the lead and comments that Socrates looks totally out of place and appears *never* to have left Athens, by some peculiar turn Socrates knows more about where they are than Phaedrus does, and he is clearly the one who responds to the charms of this "all-beautiful (*pan-kalos*) place." In short order he will be "nymph-possessed" and sense that he "has a god within." The language of divine possession runs throughout the first half of the *Phaedrus*; some of the early references may be said in jest or with a sense of Socratic irony but they should not be dismissed out of hand. In his second speech Socrates will praise divine madness as a gift (manifest in four forms) and recognize "en-thusiasm," literally "having the god within" as necessary for soul-travel. If he were not in this place it is doubtful whether Socrates could describe the unencumbered soul's dance with the gods in heaven or the realm of Being beyond heaven which no poet here on earth has ever described before.<sup>3</sup>

A word about the structure of the *Phaedrus*. After Socrates and Phaedrus come to the grove, the dialogue consists of three speeches on love (at least, formally), followed by a long discourse on the art of rhetoric. There is no more difficult task in reading the *Phaedrus* than to determine finally what holds it together: rhetoric, love, the soul, the idea of Beauty, philosophy. It is a question that has been asked since antiquity. The problem is all the more surprising because in the discussion of rhetoric Socrates says that any good composition, like a living creature, should have a head, guiding it. So, what is the head of the *Phaedrus*?<sup>4</sup>

The first speech, by Lysias, is read out loud, on the clever, if morally repugnant, theme that the beloved should grant his favors to a non-lover rather than to a lover. Phaedrus is greatly impressed by it, an *epideictic* show piece designed to advertise Lysias' rhetorical prowess. But far from being cured by hearing it, Socrates feels that he can do better, influenced in this belief in part by something he has heard from ancient writers (he suspects from the poets Sappho and Anacreon) and in part by Dionysos, by the gods of the grove, and by Phaedrus himself. This leads to Socrates'

<sup>3</sup> See "Interpretative Essay," pages 94-5 and Glossary under *Divine possession*.

<sup>4</sup> For an extended discussion of the unity of the *Phaedrus*, see the Interpretative Essay.

first speech which, Phaedrus stipulates, must be on the same topic as Lysias' speech. But it also differs: Lysias is a *poietes* while Socrates calls himself an *idiotes*; Lysias' speech was written, Socrates' will be impromptu.<sup>5</sup> Socrates feels shame as he delivers his speech, his head hidden under his cloak the whole time he speaks. He concludes abruptly and never does praise the virtue of a non-lover; his challenge over, he is eager to cross the river and head back to Athens when his private spirit (or daemon) says "no." As is the custom of this daemon, no explanation is offered, but Socrates comes to realize (with the help of some lines from the poet Ibycus) that he has offended Eros, the god of Love, who must now be appeased. Thus begins Socrates' visionary second speech, called a palinode after the famous palinode by Stesichorus when the poet took back what he said in his first poem about Helen going to Troy. In doing so, Stesichorus, unlike Homer, regained his eyesight. Socrates hopes to make amends with Eros before he is similarly maimed.

As was true of Lysias, Socrates in his first speech is as interested in rhetoric as he is in his subject matter. But in the second speech (also impromptu), talk of rhetoric vanishes, as if what Socrates has to say pushes aside commentary on how he should be saying it. In the palinode, Socrates will distinguish between two kinds of madness, one the product of human illness, the other a divine gift, "the greatest of all good things" to come to humankind. He divides divine madness into four kinds: mantic, from Apollo; initiation into the mysteries ascribed to Dionysos; poetic madness from the Muses; erotic, the fourth and best, from Aphrodite and Eros. The speech is clearly ecstatic, revealing what "no poet has done before": the winged soul (in the form of a charioteer driving a pair of horses, one white, the other black), dancing with the gods in the heavens and looking with them from the rim of heaven to the immortal Forms beyond heaven. In time, Socrates reports, the soul will lose her wings and fall to earth. Only a divinely-inspired erotic madness (not the "unnatural" kind leading to procreation) can cause those heavenly wings to re-sprout, enabling ascent after the soul is freed from the mortal body.<sup>6</sup>

A discussion on the art of rhetoric follows in the second half of the dialogue, Phaedrus saying next to nothing about the content of the palinode. Accordingly, the *Phaedrus* is often divided into two halves: speeches in the first half, the rather somber discussion of art in the second. Or, one might consider dividing the dialogue into thirds: the first and third parts about speech-making, framing a vision of love and the immortal soul in the middle. It is during the discussion of rhetoric that Socrates proposes a definition of rhetoric as soul-guiding which befuddles Phaedrus initially.

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<sup>5</sup> See Glossary under *Unskilled speaker* and the Interpretative Essay, pages 91-4.

<sup>6</sup> See the Interpretative Essay, pages 80-2.

A word about boy-love in the *Phaedrus*. It refers to the ancient Greek custom of an older man (*erastes*, or lover) being sexually aroused by a “beloved” (an *eromenos*), also called a “boy” (*pais*) or “darling” (*paidika*). As seen in archaic poetry, Eros (Love) is an illness which seizes, melts, burns, freezes, whips, pierces body and soul, “shaking the heart like a wind rushing down upon a tree,” to quote from the seventh-century poet Sappho (fr. 47). Ancient Greek pederasty (“love of a boy”) is often equated with our modern term “homosexuality,” though the two forms of love are distinct in a number of crucial ways. According to the standard modern interpretation, the ancient Greek relationship between lover and beloved was far from symmetrical or reciprocal. In this model, an older man (the *erastes*), driven by *eros* (sexual passion), pursues a sexually passive boy (the *eromenos*) who seeks *philia* (friendship) from the relationship. The lover’s apparent advantage from age, experience, and social station, however, is more than offset by the boy’s beauty which drives the man into a frenzy, and by the boy’s power to choose between various suitors. In return for the lover’s attention, the beloved is expected to “gratify” (*charizesthai*) the lover sexually, which takes the form of the man rubbing his penis between the boy’s thighs (what is known as the intercrural position). In theory, penetration in any form is scorned. The beloved would be ostracized if he sought sexual pleasure for himself. His reward is, minimally, material benefit and, ideally, affection and social advancement into adult (male) life. Much of the talk about love in the *Phaedrus* conforms to this asymmetrical model. From this perspective, Lysias’ argument that a boy should grant favors to a non-lover appears to offer a radical, and witty, departure from convention, but Socrates’ vision in the palinode of erotic reciprocity between man and boy would be a much deeper challenge to Greek same-sex eroticism. Recent studies, however, have shown that in Athens by 400 BCE sexual mores were changing: love between men of the same age (usually adolescents and young adults) was increasingly common, and reciprocal sexual gratification no longer socially scorned. Socrates’ reiteration of a popular saying, “the young delight in the young” (240c), may indeed reflect these new mores. In short, we may conclude that sexual conventions and the respective ages of the *erastes* and the *eromenos* were in flux at the time Plato was writing the *Phaedrus*. While the *erastes* may typically have been an adult and married, he could be no more than an aging adolescent, and the *eromenos*, in theory a beardless boy, in practice could be as old as thirty or even thirty-five, in which case he might have shaved in an effort to retain his “boyish” looks.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For the conventional view, see Kenneth Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London, 1978) and David Halperin, “Homosexuality” in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Oxford, 1996) 720-23. For the necessary modifications of this view, see T. K. Hubbard (ed.), *Homosexuality in Greece and Rome: A Sourcebook of Basic Documents* (Berkeley, 2003).

Even given this flexibility of conventions, the sexual relations between the various players in the *Phaedrus* are confusing, no doubt deliberately so. It is easy to imagine Lysias' speech as an effort to seduce Phaedrus or anyone else who might happen to hear or read him. In this context, the renowned rhetorician Lysias would be the (non)-*erastes* and Phaedrus the *eromenos*. But on two occasions, Lysias is said to be Phaedrus' "darling," as the up-and-coming rhetorician Isocrates is called Socrates' "darling." If we fix the dramatic date of the *Phaedrus* at 410 BCE,<sup>8</sup> the historical Socrates would be 59 and his "darling" Isocrates 26, while Phaedrus would be in his late thirties and his "darling" Lysias 48, an absurd idea.<sup>9</sup> But historical verisimilitude should not be pushed too strenuously. The characters of

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<sup>8</sup> Lysias was out of Athens from 415 to 412/411 BCE, making the possible dramatic dates of the *Phaedrus* either 418-416 or 411-404. Both positions have been forcefully argued. The earlier date links the dialogue more closely in dramatic time to Plato's *Symposium*, doubly placed in 415 and 400; the later date overlaps with the dramatic date for Plato's *Republic*. As indicated in the notes to this translation, quite a few passages in the *Phaedrus* recall passages from a number of other Platonic dialogues, but particularly from either the *Symposium* or the *Republic*. In one instance Phaedrus seems to be jokingly referring to the *Republic* (cf. 276e).

<sup>9</sup> Socrates' dates are 469-399 BCE; he is an Athenian. Lysias' dates are (circa) 459-380 BCE. He is a resident "metic" in Athens, a technical term for a foreigner with many legal rights. He lived in Athens until his father Kephalos died, when he moved to Thurii in southern Italy in 415 before coming back to Athens in 412-411. He and his brother Polemarkhos were arrested by the Thirty Tyrants in 403; Polemarkhos was killed and Lysias barely escaped. He returned with the democratic forces later that year. Plato's *Republic* takes place in Kephalos' house in Piraeus, Athens' port. Phaedrus was an Athenian born circa 450 BCE; he also appears in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Symposium*. Isocrates (an Athenian born in 436) is only mentioned once at the end of the dialogue but some consider him to be the true object of Plato's attack against conventional rhetoric. He lived to the age of 98, dying in 338 BCE. He considered himself a philosopher whose teaching was embodied in a principle of education based on rhetorical training. Like Socrates in this dialogue, he claimed that he was an *idiotes*, by which he meant something quite different from Socrates (see note 19 and Glossary under *Unskilled speaker*). Plato, also an Athenian, is Isocrates' younger contemporary and rival; he is born circa 429 and dies in 347. Another rhetorician, Alkidamas, is not named in the dialogue but a number of phrases in the *Phaedrus* are also found in his tract against rhetoricians who, like Isocrates, relied on writing rather than extemporaneous composition. It is not possible to determine whether the *Phaedrus* or Alkidamas' treatise against writers is earlier. Alkidamas was born in Elaia in Aiolis in Asia Minor and came to Athens sometime in the fourth century to teach rhetoric. (For an excerpt of Alkidamas' treatise on written and extemporaneous speeches, see Appendix D).

the *Phaedrus*, like its grove, are elements in a drama that has only an approximate relation to literal reality.<sup>10</sup>

Within the context of the dialogue, it seems natural to see Socrates as trying to seduce Phaedrus away from Lysias. The exchanges between Socrates and Phaedrus can be sexually playful; once Socrates even addresses Phaedrus as “my boy” (267c). But how serious is this play? Physical intimacy and philosophy need not be incompatible, as the Zeus/Ganymede model shows (255a-c). But how close a model is Ganymede for Phaedrus?<sup>11</sup> Both of Socrates’ speeches are addressed to a “beautiful (darling) boy,” the same boy addressed in Lysias’ speech. Is Socrates *also* playfully addressing his companion? Phaedrus clearly wants to think that he is. Just before the palinode when Socrates asks “Where is the boy with whom I was just speaking?,” Phaedrus responds: “That boy’s right here, always by your side whenever you wish” (243e).

If Socrates is trying to seduce Phaedrus, he, unlike Lysias, is not interested in a physical conquest. Socrates concludes the palinode with a prayer to Eros that Phaedrus who is “going in two directions” be turned toward a love of philosophy. In a narrow sense, Phaedrus is torn between Lysias’ and Socrates’ speeches; more broadly, he must decide between sophistic and philosophical rhetoric, that is, between style and form on the one hand and truth and pursuit of wisdom on the other. Socrates prays to turn Phaedrus’ love for surface beauty towards a love of wisdom and true Beauty. In thinking about the unity of the *Phaedrus*, one might conjecture that its “head” lies here: the uniting theme of soul-turning, whether through divinely-inspired love or the philosophically trained rhetorician guiding souls. By the end of the dialogue, Phaedrus will embrace Socrates’ peculiar definition of rhetoric and his claims that true rhetoric must serve the needs of philosophy. The “boy’s” acceptance of these stipulations suggests that the philosopher has succeeded, at least temporarily, in taming the more undisciplined aspects of Phaedrus’ tastes and in re-orienting his soul.

<sup>10</sup> So Cicero also argued; cf. *De Oratore* 1.7.28.

<sup>11</sup> One’s point of view affects translation. After his palinode, Socrates calls upon “noble creatures”—arguments—to persuade *kallipaida*...*Phaidron*, that unless he learns to love wisdom he will never become a competent speaker. Literally *kallipaida* means “beautiful boy” (261a); some scholars argue that the word links this new turn in the dialogue to Socrates’ speech on divine erotic madness just concluded, as there he called his addressee “my beautiful (darling) boy” (*o pai kale*, 243e; cf. 267c). But others who downplay the attraction between the two interlocutors tend to follow an ancient commentator who claimed that *kallipaida* means “a father of beautiful offspring,” i.e. that Phaedrus is a begetter of speeches, as Socrates implies at 242a-b. I translate *kallipaida* “beautiful boy,” by far the more likely meaning of the word.

## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The range in tone, style, and vocabulary in the *Phaedrus* is enormous. My first effort as translator is to capture in English the lively spirit of exchange and discovery in the conversation and the great rhetorical variety from one speech to the next, while still adhering as closely as possible to the Greek. At the level of the sentence, I try to replicate in English what I see as the points of emphasis in the Greek. This can require a rearrangement of clauses or converting a participle to a main verb, or vice versa. Greek has small parts of speech called "particles" which serve as sentence "dividers" and show how a sentence is to be read in the context of what comes before it. A good deal of effort is spent in trying to convey these colorings in English. In the speeches, I also try to identify the logical units of thought, again often marked by "particles." At times, my paragraph breaks differ from those found in Burnet's Oxford text of 1901 which I followed for the most part.

Most of the Greek names are rendered in their more familiar Latinate forms: so Phaedrus instead of Phaidros, Alcibiades instead of Alkibiades, Achelous instead of Akheloos, for example. For less familiar names, like Kephalos, Akoumenos, Oreithuia, and Pharmakeia, I have retained the Greek spellings.

As mentioned in Appendix E, Marsilio Ficino translated the complete works of Plato into Latin in 1484 (Florence; 2<sup>nd</sup> edition published in Venice in 1491). The first printed edition of Plato's works in Greek was published by the Aldine press in Venice in 1513, with the assistance of the great Greek scholar Marcus Musurus. In 1534 at Basle, Valder, with the aid of Simon Grynaeus, published an edition of Plato's works along with Proclus' commentary. In 1578 at Paris, Henricus Stephanus (Henri Estienne, or Henry Stephens), aided by Johannes Serranus (Jean de Seræ) published in three folio volumes a grand edition of Plato's works which were dedicated to

Queen Elizabeth, King James VI of Scotland, and the Consuls of the Republic of Berne, respectively. The pages of the folio were subdivided into five parts ([a], b, c, d, e) and these pages and letterings, printed in the margins of modern editions, have become the standard basis of reference for Plato's corpus.

It has been a most enjoyable experience to translate this dialogue, largely thanks to my students in a *Phaedrus* seminar, and it is to them that I wish to dedicate this translation: Collomia Charles, Darcie Hutchison, Stuart Koonce, Theodore Korzukhin, Melissa Mitchell, Jonathan Schwiebert, Michael Skor, and Franco Trivigno.

I also owe a great debt of thanks to Frank Nisetich, Harry Thomas, Jonathon Aaron, Michael Keating and Kathleen Lancaster, and to my wife, Rosanna Warren, mystery and book.

## PLATO'S PHAEDRUS

**Socrates:** My dear Phaedrus, where have you been? And where are you going? 227a

**Phaedrus:** I've been with Lysias, Kephalos' son,<sup>1</sup> Socrates, and now I'm going for a walk outside the city walls. I've been with him a long time, since dawn in fact. Now I'm headed for the country, following the advice of our friend, Akoumenos,<sup>2</sup> who says it's more refreshing to walk there than in our city's covered colonnades.<sup>3</sup> b

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<sup>1</sup> Kephalos was what the Athenians called a *metic*, a resident alien with special legal rights. He was extremely wealthy with a fortune made from selling arms. He lived in Piraeus, Athens' port, where he also had his arms factory, and it was at his home that the *Republic* takes place. Lysias' brother, Polemarchos, is mentioned at 257c for being more philosophical than Lysias. Polemarchos has a speaking part in the *Republic* and was killed by the Thirty in 404 BCE for his money.

<sup>2</sup> Akoumenos is a doctor, and father (or older relative) of Eruximachos, also a doctor, Phaedrus' lover, and a speaker in Plato's *Symposium*. All three are sympathetic to the new sophistic movement. References to doctors and medical terminology permeate the dialogue, in the discussion both of love and of rhetoric. Like most ancient Greeks, Lysias considered love a sickness (231d), a view which Socrates shares in his first speech but challenges in his second speech when he says that the love of beauty is "the only doctor for the soul's greatest labors and pains" (252b). At the end of the dialogue, the art of medicine is compared to the art of rhetoric, one affecting the body, the other the soul (270b-d). The *Phaedrus* also raises the question of whether a practitioner of an art can pass his knowledge to another, either as a teacher to a pupil or a father to a son (268c-269a).

<sup>3</sup> Phaedrus does not say "the city's covered colonnades," but simply *dromoi* (literally: "(open) race courses"). Elsewhere Plato uses the phrase "covered

**Socrates:** Well said, my dear companion.<sup>4</sup> So Lysias was in town, it seems.

**Phaedrus:** Yes, at Epikrates' house, where Morukhos use to live, near the temple of Olympian Zeus.<sup>5</sup>

**Socrates:** How were you spending your time there? Let me guess: Lysias was feasting you with his speeches.

**Phaedrus:** You'll find out, if you have time to come along and listen.

**Socrates:** What? Don't you think I'd consider this "more important than business itself," as Pindar puts it, to hear how you and Lysias were spending your time?

c **Phaedrus:** Lead on, then.

**Socrates:** I will, if you speak.

**Phaedrus:** As a matter of fact, Socrates, our talk suited you well, because we spent our time talking about love. For Lysias has written about a beautiful boy and how he was pursued, but not by a lover, and it's just in this that Lysias was so refined. He argues that favors should be granted to one who is *not* in love with you rather than to one who is.

d **Socrates:** What a noble man. Would that he had written that favors should be granted to someone who is poor rather than rich, and to someone who is getting on in years rather than to a younger man, and other such qualities which apply to me and to most of us. Now that speech would be really clever and of public use. As it is, I have already built up such a desire to hear his words that if you were to walk all the way to Megara—as far as its wall and back again (as the good doctor Herodikos prescribes), I wouldn't leave your side for all the world.<sup>6</sup>

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runways" to refer to a gymnasium's colonnades and I assume that *dromoi* here is an abbreviated reference to the same place, a favorite haunt for young men to congregate.

<sup>4</sup> Socrates most frequently calls Phaedrus *phile*, "my friend" (11 times). For "friend," "my dear companion," and other vocative addresses to Phaedrus, and for the forms of address which Phaedrus uses in return, see the Glossary under *Vocative addresses*. Also see notes, 11, 40, 41, and 96.

<sup>5</sup> The comic poet Aristophanes singles out Morukhos for his lavish living. We are to assume that Lysias is also living in luxury. Images of feeding occur frequently in the first half of the *Phaedrus*, playful metaphors which become more bold in Socrates' second speech when he says that the soul feeds on or shares in the banquet of heavenly Being (247e; cf. 246e and 248b).

<sup>6</sup> Greek allows for a conditional construction not available in English. Socrates begins the if-clause as though it were a remote possibility, but concludes the condition in strongest possible terms ("I wouldn't leave your side").

The *Phaedrus* is Plato's least political dialogue. Its central themes – rhetoric, love, the soul – recur throughout Plato's writings, but philosophically, poetically, and topographically, the *Phaedrus* is a world apart.

– Stephen Scully, *from the Introduction*

This is a fine translation, both fluent and accurate. It captures the range of tonalities of the original in elegant English that is neither stiffly formal nor cheaply colloquial....The supplementary matter is appropriate and useful. The introduction is crisp and clear, the interpretive essay illuminating... Scully has done a sound and serious job of translating and annotating for the general reader. Above all, his translation is excellent in respect to style and clarity: really a pleasure to read.

– David Konstan, *Brown University*

**Stephen Scully** is an Associate Professor of Classical Studies at Boston University. He is the author of *Homer and the Sacred City*, as well as numerous essays and articles on Homer, Attic Tragedy, and Virgil.

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